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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

]

Plaintiff and Appellee,

]

vs.

]

EMER KENT WESTWARD,
Defendant and Appellant.

])

Case No. 940530-CA

]
REPLY BRffiF
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE STATE MISAPPREHENDS THE SCOPE OF THE
OFFENSE OF FORGERY.
Before one can properly evaluate the state's arguments, it is necessary to
fully appreciate the difference between the state's theory of the scope of the offense as
defined by Utah Code Ann. §76-6-501 and the theory which defendant advances.
In his opening brief, the defendant conceded that the state's theory of the
case, as it related to the alleged victimization of Packer and Mountain America Credit
Union, fell within the scope of the offense of forgery. The defendant argued only that
the evidence did not support a conviction under such a theory. See Appellant's Brief
at 17-21, 29-30.
With respect to the state's theory that the defendant intended to defraud
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Bauers, Bassetts, and ERA Realty, the defendant not only argues that the evidence will
not support a conviction under these theories (id. at 26-29), defendant contends that the
wrongs allegedly committed against these !Victims" do not fall within the scope of the
charged offense because there is no legal nexus between defendant's purpose in making
the "unauthorized" endorsement and any fraud allegedly perpetrated against Bauers,
Bassetts, or ERA Realty. See id. at 21-26.
The state dismisses this argument, stating only:
The fault with defendant's arguments is the fact that the victim(s)
of defendant's "purpose to defraud" need not be identified in order
to obtain a forgery conviction; so long as there was sufficient
evidence to establish that he had such an intent toward someone,
the state's burden is met.
Appellee's Brief at 20 (emphasis added).
The state then discounts defendant's reliance on State v. Rios, 246 Kan.
517, 792 P.2d 1065 (1990), contending that the definition of "intent to defraud" under
Kansas law "add[s] additional requirements" to the offense of forgery, i.e., deception,
inducement, and reliance. Appellee's Brief at 20, fn. 5. The state seems to be unaware
that these are the elements of fraud under Utah law and that "defraud" is the verb form
of the noun "fraud". See Appellant's Brief at 22-23.
The state insists that the definition of "purpose to defraud" which it
extracts from State v. Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah App. 1991), dispenses with
the necessity of demonstrating deception, inducement, or reliance.
Gonzalez is not a legislative enactment. Its holding can be no broader
than the issues presented by the facts of that case. It cannot reasonably be read so as
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to dispense with the traditional elements of fraud: these were all clearly established by
the facts of that case. Nor can Gonzalez be read as dispensing with the requirement
that there be a nexus between these elements. Gonzalez attempted to induce the
would-be victim to rely upon the false writing. The false writing was the instrumentality
of the intended fraud. In the context of the facts of that case, the language upon which
the state relies is a statement of traditional legal principles. Gonzalez talks in terms of
fl

us[ing] a false writing . . . in order to gain" an advantage. (Emphasis added.)
In a forgery offense, the false writing is the instrumentality of the

fraudulent objective. The state initially suggests that the false writing must be one of
the acts "upon which the completion of the fraud depend[s]". Appellee's Brief at 24-25.
While the state pays lip service to the concept that "the completion of the fraud" must
depend upon the false writing, the state never indicates why perpetration of an
unarticulated fraud against Bauers, Bassetts, or ERA Realty was dependant upon the
forgery of the subject endorsement. The state ultimately argues: "[E]ven if the jurors
found that defendant intended to defraud different people or to do so in different ways,
all of which culminated in the forged check, they were justified in convicting defendant
of forgery . . . . " Appellee's Brief at 27. (Emphasis added.) The state's earlier allusion
to a nexus requirement evaporates with this argument.
In substance and effect, the state concludes that the nexus requirement
is satisfied by proof of nothing more than the fact that an advantage was gained in a
transaction which "culminated" in making of a false writing. Such a nexus would be
established by the facts of the hypothetical which appears in footnote 10 on page 22 of
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Appellant's Brief.
While shopping, H discovers that he has forgotten his checkbook
and has mistakenly brought a checkbook belonging to W, his wife.
H is not authorized to sign on W's account. He proceeds to the
checkout stand intending to make the purchase by signing W's
name to a check, confident that W will ratify the act. In ringing up
the purchases the cashier mistakenly charges H $4 for an item
which costs $6. H notices the error but says nothing. He
completes the purchase, signing W's name to the check.
Under the state's theory, H is guilty of forgery even if W ratifies H's
signature and W's bank pays the check upon presentment.

The payment of the

instrument does not alter the fact that H did not have authority to sign the instrument
or the fact that he used it in order to take advantage of the cashier's mistake.

H

obtained an "advantage" in a transaction which "culminated" in the making of a false
writing. Indeed, one could even argue that "the completion of [H's] fraud depended"
upon the "forgery" because he had no other way of completing the transaction.
According to the state, "the on-going fraud against the Bauers, Vicki
Bassett and E R A Realty" provides the requisite "purpose to defraud" and will support
the defendant's conviction.1 Appellee's Brief at 24. The argument logically continues:
The "fraud" perpetrated "against the Bauers, Vicki Bassett and E R A Realty" can be
established without regard to the defendant's purpose in endorsing the check. Indeed,
that "fraud" would have been established whether the endorsement was false or genuine.

The state makes this assertion undaunted by the trial court's conclusions that there was no fraud
perpetrated against ERA Realty (R 1042,1045-46) or the Bauers (R 1238) and without identifying any fraud
which was perpetrated against Bassetts. Although the validity of many of the state's arguments presupposes
the factual, as well as the legal, validity of the claims regarding frauds allegedly perpetrated against Bauers,
Bassetts, and ERA Realty, the state did not respond to the defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence offered in support of these claims. See Appellant's Brief at 26-29. Indeed, the state suggests that
these challenges "need not be addressed by this Court.11 Appellee's Brief at 24.
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Even if the defendant endorsed the check in absolute good faith erroneously believing
that he was authorized, he is guilty of forgery. His "purpose to defraud" is established
by the "fraud" he perpetrated against "the Bauers, Vicki Bassett and ERA Realty", which
"fraud" is established notwithstanding the defendant's goodwill toward Packer and
Mountain America without regard to his good faith in making the endorsement.
The scope of the offense of forgery is not reasonably extended to
circumstances where there is no nexus between the fraud perpetrated and the
defendant's purpose in making the false writing. See discussion in Point VI, supra.
POINT II
THE STATE'S ARGUMENTS REGARDING
UNANIMITY ARE WITHOUT MERIT.

JURY

The state's view of the scope of offense of forgery forms the basis of its
response to defendant's arguments regarding jury unanimity.
The plain language of both the statute and the instruction [No. 14C] make clear that the jury need not identify either the particular
fraud or the specific victim in order to decide whether defendant
acted with "a purpose to defraud". . . . Consequently, even if the
jurors found that defendant intended to defraud different people
or to do so in different ways, all of which culminated in the forged
check, they were justified in convicting defendant of forgery so long
as they found that he acted with a "purpose to defraud anyone".
Appellee's Brief at 27.
Even if the state were correct in its view of the scope of this offense, the
verdict nevertheless cannot stand. Jury unanimity means more than a conclusory
agreement that the defendant has violated the statute in question.

There is a

requirement of substantial agreement as to the principal factual elements underlying a
5

specified offense. See United States v. Duncan, 850 F.2d 1104, 1110-15 (CA6 1988);
United States v. Beros, 833 F.2d 455, 461 (CA3 1987); United States v. Gipson, 533 F.2d
453, 456-59 (CA5 1977). This is not to say that "each bit of evidence must be
unanimously credited or entirely disregarded, but it does require unanimous agreement
as to the nature of the defendant's violation, not simply the fact that a violation has
occurred." McKov v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 449 n.5, 110 S.Ct. 1227, 1237 n.5,
108 L.Ed. 2d 369, 385 n.5 (1990) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
The state argues that under its theory of the scope of this offense, "the
jury need not identify either the particular fraud or the specific victim". The state
apparently contends that it logically follows that the jury need not unanimously agree
upon "either the particular fraud or the specific victim." This argument is clearly without
merit.
Furthermore, the state fails to address defendant's argument that even
though the jurors may have unanimously agreed on a particular fraud or a specific
victim, they may have agreed upon a theory which had no factual or legal viabiUty. See
Appellant's Brief at 20-21.
POINT III
THE VARIANCE BETWEEN THE BILL OF PARTICULARS
AND THE PROOF OFFERED AT TRIAL PREJUDICED THE
DEFENDANT AND THIS CLAIM OF ERROR HAS NOT
BEEN WAIVED.
As discussed in Point I, supra, a theory of criminal responsibility based
upon an intent to defraud Nicole Packer is at variance, factually and legally, with a
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theory under which Bauers, Bassetts, or ERA Realty is the alleged victim.
The state argues that notwithstanding the fact that Nicole Packer had been
identified as the alleged victim in the bill of particulars, the defendant should have been
on notice as to the scope and theory of the offense which the state intended to advance
because the defendant had received copies of the original information charging him and
his wife with several offenses, had reviewed the probable cause statement, and had
attended the preliminary hearing. Appellee's Brief at 17. This argument assumes that
the defendant should have known that he would be tried for the 'Svrongs11 which
provided the basis for charges which had been fQed against him and subsequently
dismissed as well as the ,!wrongsM which provided the basis for the charges which were
pending against his wife. Clearly this claim is without merit.
Finally, the state argues that the defendant failed to request a continuance
and therefore waived any claim based upon the variance. This argument is also without
merit. As soon as it because apparent that the state would not be bound by its bill of
particulars, the defendant moved for a mistrial. This was a request for the ultimate
continuance.
The state relies upon State v. Fulton, 743 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1044 (1988). In Fulton, the Utah Supreme Court held:
The principal underlying the variance rule was eloquently stated in
State v. Mvers, 5 Utah 2d 365, 372, 302 P.2d 276, 280 (1956):
It would be a mockery of the constitutional rights of
defendant to allow the state to falsely state the
particulars of the offense charged and then without
amendment and without giving defendant additional
time to meet new evidence beyond these particulars
7

obtain a conviction founded on said evidence.
For this reason, whenever the prosecution changes its position, a
defendant may seek a continuance. If the trial court finds the
variance to be prejudicial, it must grant a continuance as a matter
of right. See id.; State v. Waid, 92 Utah 297, 311-12, 67 P.2d 647,
654 (1937)(Wolfe J., concurring); cf. State v. Burnett 712 P.2d 260,
261-62 (Utah 1985).
742 P.2d at 1215.
It is interesting to note that Fulton cites Burnett as authority. Burnett is
the principal case upon which defendant relied in arguing this issue in his opening brief.
Appellant's Brief at 15-17. In Burnett, the defendant moved for a mistrial in response
to the state's departure from the theory outlined in the information. When that motion
was denied the defendant did not make a separate motion for a continuance. Burnett's
conviction was reversed based upon the prejudicial variance.
In substance, the state argues that a motion for a continuance is sufficient
to preserve the issue but a motion for mistrial is not. Counsel is not aware of any
authority supporting such a proposition.

POINT IV
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION.
Purpose to Defraud Packer. The state argues: "The mere act of endorsing Packer's
name to the check without authority was sufficient to imply a purpose to defraud and
meet the State's burden of proof on this element of forgery." Appellee's Brief at 21.
The state has not addressed the defendant's argument that an inference of a purpose
to defraud does not arise if surrounding facts and circumstances indicate the possibility
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that the endorsement was made for a legitimate purpose. See Appellant's Brief at 1719.
The state then reviews the direct evidence of defendant's intent to
defraud. In so doing, the state argues: "[T]he jury was justified in believing Packer's
testimony that, although she agreed to accept $1,000 for her part in the transactions, she
did so only because the defendant led her to believe that $1,000 was one third of the
expected profits (Tr. Vol. I. 937)." Appellee's Brief at 21-22 (emphasis added). This
is the state's "flagship" example of direct evidence of the defendant's intent to defraud
Packer.
A review of that portion of the record which the state cites demonstrates
that the state's summary of Packer's testimony materially distorts the evidence. The
following is the testimony which the state purports to have summarized:
Q. [BY THE PROSECUTOR] Okay, were you ultimately paid
some money for doing what it is you told defendant Emer Kent
Winward and Kimberlee H. Winward you would do?
A. [BY MS. PACKER] Yes.
Q. How much were you paid?
A. One thousand dollars.
Q. And when you received the thousand dollars, did you think that
that was your full payment?
A. Yes.
Q. What did you think that represented?
A. One-third of what would have been $3,000.00 which would have
been the profit.
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R937.
Packer never testified that she agreed to accept a thousand dollars
because the defendant led her to believe that the profit in the transaction was $3,000.00.
Packer's testimony under cross-examination indicates that there were apparently several
discussions about projected profits and that in these discussions the projections 'Varied11
apparently with the discussion of different possible scenarios. She was unable to relate
any specific projection. Packer's testimony on this point is completely reconcilable with
the defendant's testimony.

Appellant's Brief at 19-21. Furthermore, there is no

evidence that at the time the defendant and his wife agreed to pay Packer $1,000.00
they knew what the net profit would be.
The state has apparently scoured the trial record in an attempt to locate
any available evidence which provides direct proof of the defendant's intent to defraud
Packer. It has fallen short.
Purpose to Defraud Bassett. After identifying Bassett as the defendant's client, the
state's factual summary continues:
Defendant told [Bassett] that she needed to secure a home to
appear stable and to help her position in the custody battle (Tr.
Vol. I. 915-16). She explained that she did not have money for a
down payment, and defendant said he had located a home which
she could purchase without any money down (Tr. Vol. I. 895-96;
Vol. II. 1065, 1069).
Appellee's Brief at 8-9.
The state returns to this theme in a footnote:
Although Bassett agreed to pay 11% interest, the paperwork at
closing reflected 13% interest (Tr. Vol. I. 915-16). When the
10

witness asked defendant about it, he told her that she didn't have
to complete the deal then stressed to her how much more stable
she would appear in the custody matter if she had a home (id.).
Appellee's Brief at 9, fn. 3 (emphasis added).
This summary obviously suggests that the defendant attempted to interest
his client in securing a home when she was apparently not in the market. This he
accomplished by using knowledge of her personal difficulties and by suggesting that it
would be good strategy in the custody contest in which he was representing her. The
summary further suggests that when Pat Williams insisted on an interest rate of 13%,
the defendant overcame any resistance Bassett may have had to closing the transaction
by "stress[ing] to her how much more stable she would appear in the custody matter if
she had a home."
The state supports these statements with two citations to the same two
pages of the trial transcript. At that point in the record, Bassett testifies that when she
got to the closing the interest rate on the note which was to be assigned to Williams was
13 rather than 11 percent. Defense counsel than asked Bassett whether or not the
defendant told her that she was not obligated to close the transaction. Bassett responds:
Yes, he did, but Kent at that time knew the situation with my
children. My children were putting pressure on me to get this
custody thing over with. They wanted to come back and live with
their mother and I was facing, at that time, a home study with a
social worker. I needed to show stability. I needed to show the
social worker that I had a place to put all three of my children and
that, basically, I didn't have to live with my mother; that I could
support myself and my kids.
R 915-16.
The state has clearly taken a great deal of liberty in summarizing this
11

testimony.
Bassett was separated from her husband and was living with her mother.
Her children were living with her former husband. She and her present husband were
trying to find a home of their own in hopes of effecting a reconciliation (R 895, 906)
but, in Mrs. Bassett's own words: "We couldn't find anything, quite honestly" (R 907).
Through the subject transaction, Bassett was able to get into a home
although she had no money to make a down payment or pay closing costs.
Furthermore, she conceded that her monthly payment on the promissory note which Pat
Williams now holds is equivalent to the fair rental value of the subject property (R 907).
While the record is not clear as to how much Mrs. Bassett knew or
understood about the overall transaction, the following excerpts from her testimony
indicate that she was aware of the elements of the transaction even if she did not
understand the significance of all of the information that she possessed.
Q. [BY THE PROSECUTOR] Okay. And how were you to pay
this $58,000.00?
A. [MRS. BASSETT] Kent knew that I didn't have a down
payment and Dan didn't have any money. I knew that my credit
wasn't well-enough established. I had only been divorced a little
over a year and my credit wasn't established well enough to be
able to get that kind of a loan, and so he said that he would seek
private financing for me.
Q. Okay. And did he tell you that he ultimately did that?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And do you know who you bought your house from?
A. Well, I purchased the home from a middle person, who I later
found out would be Nicole Packer.
12

Q. And who told you there would be a middle person?
A. Kent and Kim both.
Q. Okay. Did you know who Nicole Packer was at that time?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. How did you know who she was?
A. At that time she was associated with Kim in the capacity of her
real estate assistant and I had done several services for her.
R 896-97.
*

*

*

Q. [BY MR. PENDLETON] You were fully aware of what Kent
and Kim Winward's relationship with Nicole Packer was, weren't
you?
A. [BY MRS. BASSETT] Yes.
Q. And as far as you knew, Nicole Packer was the owner of that
home, is that correct?
A. No. She was the middle person from the original seller.
Q. Okay. So, then, they did tell you that Nicole was purchasing
the property — had contracted to purchase the property and would
sell it to you?
A. Yes.
Q. So, you were not in the dark on that, is that correct?
A. No.
Q. Did anybody misrepresent to you what Nicole Packer had
purchased it for, anyone ever tell you what she had purchased it
for?
A. No. B u t l -
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Q. Did you ever ask?
A. No, but I assumed that it would be somewhere close to
$58,000.00.
R 908-09.
Williams purchased Bassetts' note at a substantial discount because
Bassetts had either no credit or bad credit and the note had no payment history. Mrs.
Bassett apparently did not understand that such a note would have to be sold at a
substantial discount. Accordingly, she assumed that Packer and/or Winwards had made
an $18,000.00 profit.2
While the evidence may present some question regarding the ethical
propriety of engaging in this transaction with one of his clients, defendant hopes that the
foregoing clarification of the record will indicate that his conduct was not as outrageous
as the state's factual summary would suggest. Certainly, no fraud was perpetrated upon
the Bassetts.

Q. [BY THE PROSECUTOR] Okay. Tell the jury what happened. When did you
see Vicki Bassett?
A. [BY MS. PACKER] Okay. Vicki did my nails and so I saw her regularly.
Sometime in, probably, October we were discussing the transaction. She asked me
what I had done with all my money and I said, "What money?" and she said, "The
$18,000.00 you made on the sale of my house." I said, "Oh, you are mistaken. I
made $1,000.00." She said, "No, you made $18,000.00." and I said, "Well, maybe I
better go to the title company and check out some documents." So I went to the
title company, started looking at documents.
R 937-38.

14

POINT V
THE STATE'S ARGUMENT REGARDING THE EXPERT
TESTIMONY OFFERED BY HANS CHAMBERLAIN
INACCURATELY SUMMARIZES THE RECORD.
The state contends that defense counsel invited error by initiating a line
of questioning under which Chamberlain was asked if he "could determine whether an
intent to defraud exists given certain actions done within the guise of a partnership."
Appellee's Brief at 29-30. The state then contends that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in allowing Chamberlain to express his opinion as to whether or not the
prosecutor's hypothetical "would show a purpose to defraud" because Chamberlain's
testimony "assisted the jury on an issue first introduced by defendant". Appellee's Brief
at 34.
Defendant contends that the following fairly summarizes the series of
misadventures which ultimately lead to the introduction of the challenged testimony.
The record of Mr. Chamberlain's testimony is reproduced as Addendum H to Appellee's
Brief for convenient reference.
Chamberlain supposedly took the stand to rebut the defendant's
contention that he, by virtue of his licensure as an attorney, possessed authority to
endorse the subject check. As is clearly pointed out in his opening brief, defendant had
never advanced such an argument. Defendant had testified that he and Packer were coventurers, not attorney and client. Appellant's Brief at 33-34. The state's brief on
appeal assumes, without discussion, that Chamberlain's testimony on direct examination
was properly received in rebuttal. Appellee's Brief at 28.
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In eliciting this "rebuttal" testimony, the prosecutor asked Chamberlain to
draw upon his own experience in interacting with his clients. The prosecutor then asked
Chamberlain if he had an opinion as to whether or not a lawyer could sign a third
party's name (presumably a client's) to a check without that person's knowledge or
consent (R 1128). Defendant objected on the basis that the question did not provide
a sufficient hypothetical to fit the facts of this case. The objection was overruled and
Mr. Chamberlain testified:
Assuming a hypothetical that you gave me, it would be my opinion
— it would be improper for an attorney to sign a client's name to
a check and deposit it into any account, including the lawyer's own
account.
R 1129.
This opinion was followed by another question, another objection, and
another opinion.

This time Mr. Chamberlain cited Rule 1.13 of the Rules of

Professional Conduct relating to an attorney's obligation to keep safe and account for
his client's property (R 1129-30).
On cross-examination, defense counsel attempted to direct the jury's
attention to the fact that the defendant's claim of implied authority arose by virtue of
the fact that he and Packer were partners or co-venturers and was not based upon any
alleged attorney/client relationship (R 1130-32). Counsel attempted to again direct
Chamberlain's attention to his law practice and this time asked questions that related
to his relationship with his law partners rather than his clients (R 1132-34). In
responding to questions, by which defense counsel hoped to ehcit an opinion regarding
authority implied by virtue of a partnership relationship, Chamberlain's answers
16

continually suggested the necessity of an express agreement between the partners (R
1131-35).
Because Chamberlain was apparently unwilling to concede that any
authority was implied by his own partnership relationship, defense counsel changed the
hypothetical to include two auto mechanics operating an automobile repair shop. In
that hypothetical, the partners never discuss endorsing or depositing checks representing
partnership funds. In the hypothetical, one of the partners endorses the other partner's
name to such a check and deposits it into the partnership account. Defense coimsel
specifically asks Mr. Chamberlain to assume, as a matter of fact, that the partner who
endorsed the check did not intend to defraud the other partner. Defense counsel then
asked Chamberlain if, under this hypothetical a forgery would have been committed (R
1135-36).3

Chamberlain responded by stating that no forgery would have been

committed because the check was deposited in the partnership account (R 1136).
In an attempt to get Mr. Chamberlain to concede that no forgery is
committed in the absence of intent to defraud, defense counsel again posed the
hypothetical asking Chamberlain to assume that the check is not deposited in an account
designated as the partnership account.

Defense counsel again concluded the

hypothetical stating: u[I]f there is no intent to defraud, is it forgery?" (R 1136).
After requiring defense counsel to further flesh out the hypothetical,
Chamberlain finally responded:

Counsel concedes that this question is objectionable because it asked Mr. Chamberlain a question of law.
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A. [BY MR. CHAMBERLAIN] Do all the partners know of the
existence of that check I guess would be my question.
Q. [BY MR. PENDLETON] Well, assume they don't. Well let's
assume its put in the partnership account and that there is no
intent to defraud. Is that forgery?
A. I don't know. I can't look into that person's mind to determine
whether or not there is intent to defraud.
MR. PENDLETON: Okay. That's my point. Thank you. No
further questions.
R 1136-37.
Chamberlain's responses to defense counsel's hypotheticals had suggested
to the jury that, even assuming no intent to defraud exists, a person may be guilty of
forgery if the check was not deposited into the partnership account or if his partner did
not have knowledge of the existence of the check. It was time to conclude this
floundering cross-examination.
On redirect examination the prosecutor posed another hypothetical. This
time the prosecutor's hypothetical was an attempt to outline the facts of this case. The
prosecutor then asked Chamberlain: "Do you have an opinion as to whether or not that
would be with a purpose to defraud or forgery?" (R 1137) Defendant objected on the
grounds that the opinion called for was beyond Chamberlain's "field of expertise" (R
1137). The objection was overruled and Chamberlain testified: "In my opinion, that
would be evidence of intent to defraud." (R 1138) Defense counsel was, with good
reason, concerned that the jury would interpret this last opinion as an indication of how
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Chamberlain himself would weigh the evidence in this case.4
On recross-exai nination con msel attempted to formulate a hypothetical
which would approximate the facts in evidence (R 1138-41) and then asked Chamberlain
for one

IIIOIC

opmMir

I

JH-W,

docs that [iitwnil Iht* juiy question x. It) wluMhci or not

the person who signed the other partner's name acted with the intent to defraud?" (R
] 1. 1 1). Then the following exchange took place:
A. [BY MR. CHAMBERLAIN] Does that present a jury question?
Q. [BY MR. PENDLETON] Yes, does it present a jury question.
A, As (o whether or not -- I'm sorry.
Q. As to whether or not the person ~
MR. BURNS: Objection as to whether or not it presents a jury
question, Your Honor. I think he can opine as to whether or not
there is an intent to defraud.
THE COURT:: I'm going to allow -

Pendleton to place it in

that framework.
MR. BURNS: Okay.
THE COI JR'I ': Whether or not it pi esents a jury qi lestion.
Q. (By IvIr. Pendleton) Does it present a jury question as to
whether or not that person who made the endorsement on behalf
of the partner intended to defraud that partner?
A. Yes, a jury question.
R 1141-42 (emphasis added).
Mr. Chamberlain then apparently felt compelled to add what he referred

See exchange between defense counsel and Chamberlain at R 1142-43.
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to as a "caveat": "... I don't think you told me in your assumption as to whether or not
the person whose name was on the check said it was okay for the other person to sign
her name to the check" (R 1142). Chamberlain's "caveat" suggested that if there was
no express authorization to endorse the check, that fact would apparently affect his
opinion as to whether or not a jury question was even presented.
Apparently concerned that jurors may have gotten the impression that it
was their duty to decide the issue of intent to defraud, the prosecutor took Chamberlain
on redirect examination one more time. It is at this point that the exchange which is
set out on page 35 of the defendant's opening brief takes place, ultimately resulting in
the receipt of Mr. Chamberlain's opinion that the facts, as outlined in the prosecutor's
hypothetical question, constituted "strong evidence of intent to defraud" (R 1144).
While counsel concedes that this entire segment of the trial should be a
source of embarrassment to all those involved, it was not defense counsel who opened
the door to the admission of Chamberlain's opinion regarding the strength of the
evidence.
POINT VI
THE STATE'S ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE TRIAL
COURT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED
JURY INSTRUCTIONS ARE WITHOUT MERIT.
Joint Venture. The statement of the case in defendant's opening brief clearly identifies
evidence supporting the requested instructions regarding joint venture. Appellant's Brief
at 6-8. Furthermore, Packer's testimony to the effect that she and Winwards had a
business arrangement in which they divided the duties and shared the profits is quoted
20

verbatim in the relevant argument. Appellant's Brief at 42-43. The jury should have
been insti ucted as to tl le legal in lplications of si id i a i elationsl lip I\ Is Packer's question
asked in response to defense counsel's question about her participation in a joint
venture wit

, defendant was indeed perceptive;
A. [BY ^IS. PACKER] I've never called it a joint venture
agreement. I didn't think of it in those terms. I don't know what are the implications or the repercussions of being in a joint
venture with someone or is that just a fancy term that you're
using?

R 996.
Counsel would venture a guess tl lat the ji u: 01 s did not know the answer
to these questions either — probably just some "fancy term".
While the proposed instructions were brief, they would have acquainted
the jury with (1) the legal definition of a joint venture, (2) the fact that no particular
formality or writing is required in order to form a joint venture, (3) that such a venture
may be inferred by the conduct of the parties, and (4) that each member of the joint
venture stands in the relationship of agent and principal to each member of the venture.
Instead, the ji n y was given absoli itely no legal fi amework against \\ hich it could evaluate
the facts of the case.
The state c ontends that even, if the insti notions shoi ilci have been given,
defendant suffered no prejudice in the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury.
The jury had the same information before it through defendant's
cross-examination of Chamberlain and, because defendant chose
not to argue the theory in his closing argument, the jurors were
fully able to utilize the information in their deliberations regardless
of whether they received it from the court or from an expert
witness.
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Appellee's Brief at 45-46.
This argument assumes (1) that Chamberlain's testimony was an adequate
substitute for instructions on the law, (2) that Chamberlain's testimony accurately
outlined the applicable principles of law, and (3) that Chamberlain's testimony outlined
all of the legal principles stated in the proposed instructions.
Chamberlain did concede that a partnership or joint venture could be
created without !!written formality" (R 1131). He also acknowledged that partners or
co-venturers "probably" stand in an agency relationship with respect to one another (R
1132). But, according to Chamberlain, partners "have to have discussed the authority
for any implied authority to have occurred" (R 1132)(emphasis added). For further
discussion of Chamberlain's testimony, see Point V, supra.
The testimony of an expert witness is no substitute for instructions from
the court. An expert witness presents opinions, the soundness of which the jury is free
to either accept or reject. The court is duty-bound to instruct the jury as to the
principles of law applicable to the issues presented by the evidence and the jury is dutybound to follow the court's instructions.
The state's argument further suggests that since defense counsel, in
closing, did not attempt to argue the legal implications of the joint venture, the
defendant somehow waived any claim of error arising out of the court's refusal to
instruct the jury.

Counsel can argue the interpretation of the evidence and the

apphcation of the law as the jury is given to understand the law through the court's
instructions. The defendant could not argue the legal implications of the joint venture
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with any credibility where there was not legal framework by which the jury could

satisfied and whether or these parties, as a consequence of that relationship, stood in
irljilionsliip MI HIIIK* auuiln i .is pimnpnls and agents.
Specific Intent. The state's view of the scope of the offense of forgery has colored its
arguments irgaiiinin* tin ;u]r<|u<ic\ ol tin mini's mslnu'lnmii (in ^pivihr intaif,

Jury instruction no. 14-C quotes the language of the Gonzalez opinion and
defines "pi u pose to defraud" as "simply a purpose to use a false writing as if it were
genuine in order to gain some advantage" (R 240). As the state properly observes, this
instruction tfmake[s] clear that the jury need not identify either the particular fraud or
the specific victim". Appellee's Brief at 27. According to the state, 1 his Iiisti iicl ion
defined the requisite specific intent, at least to the extent such an intent needed to be
defined

Id. at 1 7

I he state notes: "[Tfhe • • was not i equir 2d to differ entiate

between specific and general intent; it need only follow the instructions and definitions
given bv tin i'oiiil""" Ul.

In Lish v. Utah Power and Light Co., 27 Utah 2d 90, 93,493 P.2d 611, 613
(

Jtah Supreme Court observed:
Ordinarily the reasoning given in an opinion of an appellate coin t
is not to be copied as an instruction to the jury in a similar case.
It does not necessarily state what the law is, but rather is made to
demonstrate the correctness of the opinion.
In the context of the facts presented in Gonzalez, the quoted language was

a statement of law made for the purpose of demonstrating the sufficiency of the
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evidence in that case. In the context of the evidence in the instant case, this language,
when considered with the other instructions, told the jurors that if the defendant
obtained any "advantage" through transactions which "culminated" in the "unauthorized"
endorsement, they should convict the defendant. See Appellee's Brief at 27.
Under these instructions and the state's theories of liability, the
defendant's specific intent in endorsing the check became irrelevant because the
requisite "purpose to defraud" could be established by proof of a "fraud" perpetrated
"against the Bauers, Vicki Bassett and ERA Realty11 and that "fraud" was established
without regard to the defendant's reason for, or purpose in, endorsing the check.
Indeed, that "fraud" would have been established whether the endorsement was false or
genuine. Even if the defendant honestly, but erroneously, believed that he had authority
to endorse the check, he would still be guilty of forgery because the requisite "purpose
to defraud" could be established by a "fraud" perpetrated "against the Bauers, Vicki
Bassett and ERA Realty" which could be estabhshed notwithstanding the defendant's
goodwill toward Packer and Mountain America Credit Union and without regard to the
defendant's good faith in endorsing the check.
Without argument, the district court's instructions "failed to acquaint the
jury with the concept of specific intent." Appellant's Brief at 44. Moreover, "the district
court's definition of 'purpose to defraud' muffled the specific intent element of this
offense to the point where it could not be heard above the roar of the instructions
defining the concept of general criminal intent." Id. at 44-45.
Refusal to give a specific intent instruction was fundamental error. This
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error was compounded by the instructions which the district court gave and which

specific victim in order to decide whether defendant acted with a "purpose to defraud".
Appellee's Uriel at 21
CONCLUSION
It us icspi'illiilly suljiiiitU'il nihil Ilii' t l H n i u l a n f \ I'uiiviction .'JimiM hi

reversed.
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